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Candidate: Gemma Gray – 391111

Title: Disaster Resilient Communities: Engagement with Spontaneous Volunteer Groups

Aim: The aim of this study is to investigate the role of spontaneous volunteer groups in strengthening community disaster resilience.

Supervisors:

Academic:

John Handmer
RMIT - Mathematical and Geospatial Sciences
Risk and Community Safety

Alan March
The University of Melbourne - Architecture Building and Planning
Bushfire, Risk, Resilience and Planning
Ph: 03 8344 7077

Industry:

Angela Sutherland
State Manager Emergency Services Australian Red Cross

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Ethics Approval

Ethics approval was granted by the University of Melbourne and categorised as low risk. Procedures were adhered to before, during and after data was collected. All participants agreed to be recorded and quoted despite the option of anonymity. For the purposes of this research, and all data collected was stored in a secure way.

Student Declaration

The work in the project was undertaken in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Melbourne for the degree of Master of Environments. The views expressed are those of the author and might not reflect the views of the University of Melbourne, Office for Environmental Programs.



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Abstract

This study tackles the confliction between the willingness of the altruistic to assist in times of disaster against the capacity of the emergency management system to effectively utilise the human resource effectively. The aim is to investigate the role of Spontaneous Volunteer Groups (SVGs) in strengthening community disaster resilience through a qualitative, context-driven research approach from a pragmatist viewpoint utilising open-ended questions. This approach is problem-driven occurring in the particular context of severe disaster events where traditional services are often overwhelmed and resources stressed. The data was collected from interviewees who have contributed significantly to the emergency management sector. The interviews were recorded, stored, analysed and emergent generalised and specific themes discussed in reference to the criteria set out in the national 2015 Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy.

The study contends that if the Australian community and emergency management sector are serious in achieving a society able to genuinely share responsibilities for resilience to disasters, and build community capacity, then the following should be promoted: inclusiveness – including allowing SVGs to self-organise; power-sharing; transparency; engagement with volunteer motivations; flexible volunteering models; preparedness to manage volunteer emergence; disaster education and training, activities identification within all disaster phases; forming strong and lasting community links; addressing risk and liability; developing on-the-spot training procedures; sharing information, skills and knowledge; communication clarity; key liaisons; altering mindsets; social media engagement and essentially developing plans and actionable procedures for empowering people to demonstrate their resilience. Currently this path can be a difficult one to follow, despite its promotion with many national strategies, due to restrictions, barriers and complexities within the sector.

The expanded upon strategy can assist the government and Emergency Service Agencies (ESAs), in the face of limited policy, to recognise their responsibilities to operate together and engage meaningfully with alternative forms of assistance in a less restrictive emergency management system, to promote optimal protection of communities from future disasters. In complex environments ESAs must demonstrate flexibility to efficiently adapt, change and restore new and more resilient function to communities.

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CHAPTER ONE: Background to the Research

Rationale

Due to the proliferation of emergency disaster events in Australia and greater perceived gaps in resources to deal with longer disaster seasons, it is increasingly recognised that Australian communities have a responsibility to reduce their own vulnerability to disasters and to enhance their resilience as contended in the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 2011 (McLennan & Handmer 2012a). The public often places emergency service agencies (ESAs) under unrealistic expectations and rely too heavily upon them to completely manage their risks, reducing their own capacity for resilience (McLennan & Handmer 2012a). It is actually most likely to be neighbours, community members or a passer-by, not ESAs, who will contribute most significantly to your initial survival during an emergency (Australian Red Cross 2015).

Individuals, groups and communities are always going to want to contribute and provide aid during disaster events (Barraket et al. 2013). Today however, the ways in which people are willing and able to volunteer their time and skills are changing (Whittaker et al. 2014). This, along with an increase in social media trends, greater media coverage of events and the rapid spread of information has resulted in a significant impact on traditional volunteering models (Whittaker et al. 2014). Some ESAs report drastic decreases in volunteer numbers whereas others report increased volunteer numbers but decreased volunteering hours, inferring that people volunteer either when they have time or when participation is vital (ABS 2007). The result of this change could lead to peaking volunteer numbers during disasters when ESAs are at their most stressed and when induction of volunteers is considered too difficult resulting in the emergence of SVGs (ABS 2007).

The convergence of large numbers of spontaneous volunteers can be overwhelming for ESAs and affect their ability to attend to their priority of assisting the affected, as a result of allocating vital resources to manage this phenomenon (Australian Emergency Management Institute 2011). Nevertheless, we know that spontaneous volunteers will emerge post-disaster therefore ESAs must prepare both to adapt to these changes and to cooperate better with emergent SVGs (McLennan et al. 2015). This can ensure they are both maximising the use of the available human resource and ensuring individuals, groups and communities can contribute to building and improving their own resilience (McLennan et al. 2015).

Problem Statement:

This study will attempt to address the paradox of people's willingness to help and provide support during under-resourced disaster events versus the capacity of emergency services to utilise effectively offers of assistance, as they are continuously overwhelmed during larger-scale disaster events.

Defining Community Disaster Resilience:

So what does a resilient community look like? Community disaster resilience can have multiple definitions (Cutter et al. 2008). The global environmental change literature in the past defined resilience as a system's capacity, after a disturbance, to re-organize into a fully functioning system and return to the original state (Cutter et al. 2008). However inability to be flexible and change can contribute to a lack of resilience and merely "springing back" from disasters is not adequate (Handmer & Dovers 1996; Klein et al. 2003). According to the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 2011, a resilient community is one in which people have an understanding of the risks they face and have the capacity to take measures to protect themselves (McLennan & Eburn 2014; Buckle 2006).

Given this, community disaster resilience, for the purposes of this study will be defined as a process, not an outcome, where adaptive capacities emerge to help promote a positive path of function and adaptation post-disaster (Brown & Kulig 1997; Norris et al. 2008). Essentially this research sees community resilience as a set of networked adaptive capacities, pre-existing organisational networks as well as partnerships and relationships able to understand complexities fundamental for an affected community or neighbourhood to cope with shocks and stresses (Norris et al. 2008; Gilbert 2010; Fitzpatrick 2012). This definition places emphasis on human capacity across individuals, communities, families, neighbours, friends, industry, business and government to adapt, change and to contribute to reduce the impacts felt after disasters while returning to an altered but improved state, in a timely manner (Fitzpatrick 2012; Chang & Shinozuka 2002).

Communities with stronger social connections and networks tend to see fewer fatalities than similar less connected communities as seen in the Japan Earthquake 2011 with a greater ability to quickly recover due to assistance from family, friends and local community groups (Aldrich 2015). The factors that most strongly influence community resilience and recovery tend to be social not physical (Aldrich & Meyer 2015). Therefore investing in strengthening social infrastructure and promoting social cohesion, by forming strong neighbourly ties and promoting knowledge and involvement in local disaster processes, can help to bridge community divides and provide essential life-saving connections providing communities with critical resilience for future disasters (Aldrich & Meyer 2015). Therefore strengthening community interventions and social infrastructure, such as SVGs, is required to enhance social supports, keep communities intact and fill gaps in services that arise (Norris et al. 2008; Aldrich 2015).

Defining Spontaneous Volunteerism:

There is extensive debate surrounding what constitutes a 'spontaneous volunteer'. They can be understood as emergent citizens, impromptu groups or ad hoc temporary groups. They are defined, for the purposes of this paper as: volunteers who contribute on impulse; create their own groups and set about disaster-related tasks once a disaster has occurred - in co-ordinated or non-coordinated ways; have not been recruited or have membership; may or may not be local residents; may or may not have relevant training or skills and are not associated with the existing emergency response (Lowe & Fothergill 2003; Whittaker et al. 2015; Fernandez et al. 2006; PoLF 2002). Restricting volunteering to solely activities that occur through ESAs under appreciates the vast work undertaken through informal initiatives essential for overall recovery efforts (Whittaker et al. 2015). Trained volunteers are also essential as the backbone of disaster response in Australia (COAG, 2011 & Stoddard 1969).

Spontaneous Volunteer Groups (SVGs) are emergent groups of spontaneous volunteers that arise spontaneously within communities that harness local knowledge, develop relationships with existing groups and aim to increase the community's resilience through informal initiatives (Buckle 2006; Webber and Jones 2013). These emergent groups, incompatible with bureaucratic response system, most often arise during large-scale events when ESAs and governments are unable to meet demands of affected persons (Beagrie 2009).

This study will focus specifically on these groups, whether they do in fact contribute to community disaster resilience and seek to determine potential ways for structured ESAs and emergent SVGs to be more compatible and achieve a shared responsibility for resilience.

Defining Shared Responsibility:

A shared responsibility for community resilience is promoted in many government and ESAs plans, however what this actually looks like within communities varies. Shared responsibility is essentially about increasing transparency about the disaster risks we face and how to realistically reduce them (McLennan & Handmer 2012c). Governments and ESAs cannot protect everyone all the time during disasters (McLennan & Handmer 2012c). It's not about governments and agencies evading their responsibilities to communities but being candid about their limitations in the face of severe and extreme disaster events (McLennan & Handmer 2012b). Communities accepting increased responsibility would require governments and ESAs relinquishing some control to communities (Victorian Government 2014). Many councils recognise that if SVGs are not incorporated into recovery structures they risk their resources being stretched too thin or being trapped in less productive managerial activities (Department of State Development, Business and Innovation, Emergency Management Victoria 2014). Reducing disaster risk and increasing community

resilience must involve non-discriminatory participation, empowerment and an all-of-society collaboration that strengthens partnerships across all groups (UNISDR 2015).

Defining Disaster:

A collectively experienced, potentially traumatic disruption to community life attributed to natural, technological or human causes resulting in property damage, loss of life and/or injury that is beyond the usual capacity of affected communities and requires particular mobilisation and organisation of resources (McFarlane & Norris 2006; EMA 2006; COAG 2011).

Australian Relevant Strategies

The Australian National Strategy of Disaster Resilience of 2011 promotes sustainable practices of a shared collective responsibility for resilience, seeing resilience as not the sole responsibility of ESAs and calling for greater flexibility and adaptability to increase capacity to deal with disasters (COAG 2011). It endorses a long-term vision of sustainable practices and enduring partnerships in the identification, facilitation and coordination of community resources (COAG 2011). However, EMV's Strategic Priorities for Emergency Management Volunteering in Victoria, developed in 2015, does not mention spontaneous volunteers despite promoting flexible volunteering models suitable for a range of alternative individual needs, a modern recruitment strategy, retention of youth and a better understanding of volunteer motivation (EMA 2015). The strategy's focus is more upon trained 'casual volunteers' to provide surge support when required for substantial emergencies in roles suitable for their level of skills and experience (EMA 2015). Emergency Management Australia (EMA) is responsible for responding to the emergence of spontaneous volunteers and promotes a comprehensive partnership approach to emergency management that develops community capacity (EMA 2006) although they too have plans focused more of recruitment and retention of trained volunteers rather than engaging more with informal spontaneous volunteers. It is therefore important to note the specific national 2015 Spontaneous Volunteers Strategy and its emphasis on: empowered individuals and communities; satisfied volunteers; the right to help and be valued; community-driven approaches and understanding spontaneous volunteers as both highly skilled and possessing the trust of the community (ANZEMC 2015).

Significance of Study:

This study will contribute to the debate and discussion around the need for implementing and expanding upon the National Strategy of Disaster Resilience. It will demonstrate how volunteerism is positively connected to greater community disaster resilience as well as elicits a therapeutic community response for both those directly affected by disasters and those who feel compelled to aid those affected (Lowe & Fothergill 2003).

This brief analysis of the key strategies demonstrates there is little integration of SVGs into preparedness, response or recovery policies in Australia and insufficient national guidelines and management plans to achieve this (COAG 2011). Consequently umbrella organisations such as Volunteering Australia have been tasked with managing SVGs (Emergency Management Victoria 2015). Australian Red Cross is a leading agency engaging with spontaneous volunteers and was recognised in 2014 for excellence in strengthening community resilience to disasters (Australian Red Cross 2015). Australian Red Cross has attempted to create a framework for best practice to incorporate spontaneous volunteer activities with the aim of reducing the drain on resources through the development of a Spontaneous Volunteer Management Resource Kit. However, often the less formal forms of volunteering are not captured or utilised within emergency services and this resource has yet to be implemented (Cottrell 2011; Whittaker et al. 2014).

ESAs can actually reduce community resilience with pre-emptive strategies to prevent inclusion (Waugh & Streib 2006). This is despite abundant evidence highlighting engagement with SVGs and accepting offers of support where practical can bring about financial, social, psychological and resilience-building benefits to communities in the long-term. Therefore the problem this study seeks to address essentially whittles down to the following quote; *"It is a paradox – people's willingness to volunteer versus the system's capacity to use them effectively"* (PoLF 2002, p. 2). Despite umbrella organisations such as Volunteering Australia working on pilot projects such as EV CREW and HELP OUT, that focus on managing pre-trained volunteers and compiling a database to store skills for future potential volunteers to better coordinate offers for assistance and mobilise civilian populations, SVGs will self-deploy whether the perceived gap in services does or does not exist (Mhatre nd; Koehler 1996). Therefore there is need for an expansion for the national Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy and for ESAs to better incorporate aspects of it into their plans and policies most effectively to utilise the creative and innovative potential of SVGs.

CHAPTER TWO: Review of the Literature

Introduction:

Disasters test not just physical resilience but social resilience (Hayward 2013; Mason 2006). They can completely disrupt the fabric of society while simultaneously providing an opportunity to improved societies (Hayward 2013). Uncertainty within the emergency service sector and the inability to cope in certain circumstances needs to be more widely recognised and disaster management responsibilities need to be evenly and justly distributed within all phases of the emergency cycle including preparedness, response and recovery (O'Neill & Handmer 2012). The literature suggests that Australia's emergency response capacity requires both trained volunteers and spontaneous volunteers in a less restrictive system allowing for greater community contribution. The approach to emergency management has, since the Second World War, started to move away from a civil defence approach and allow for emerging opportunities for innovation and cooperation (Helsott & Ruitenberg 2004). Community-driven aspects have been present, as seen in our CFAs and these strengths should be considered in our future emergency management system (McLennan & Handmer 2012).

Spontaneous Volunteer Problems and Myths:

Spontaneous volunteers can be perceived as a legal liability, safety hazard or a drain on precious time and human resources, a security liability and can be painted as an ill-equipped hindrance, burden and distraction (Fernandez et al. 2006, Orloff 2011, Whittaker et al. 2014). Their contributions are undervalued despite their extensive understanding of local problems (Whittaker et al. 2014). Despite mostly well-intentioned citizens, convergence upon a site of disaster can create issues for ESAs and disrupt a coordinated effort; this was recognised as a potentially huge concern after the September 2011 attacks (Fernandez et al. 2006; Barton 1969; Tierney et al. 2001). The absent pre-established systems for managing spontaneous volunteers can make it difficult to; process volunteers, match skills to services, communicate information effectively and integrate them into the response (Whittaker et al. 2014).

There are also myths that see spontaneous volunteers as helpless and dependent, merely panic in emergency situations and allowing them to aid in the emergency response can lead to widespread security issues such as looting and property damage (Helsloot & Ruitenberg 2004 Quarantelli & Dynes, 1969). ESAs are concerned about reputational risks due to their inability to control spontaneous volunteers or the liability they may incur if they're injured (Handmer & Dovers 1996). Much of the current disaster management literature, dating back to the 1950s, challenges the notion that disasters are solely characterised by chaos, panic and destruction with the public pitted as passive and helpless. Researches in post-disaster settings demonstrate that often citizens are found to be more cohesive than usual

overcoming great obstacles in mitigating disaster-related challenges (Whittaker et al. 2014). Fernandez, Tierney and Quarantelli found that spontaneous volunteers are critical for community recovery, to support trained volunteers and ESAs and looting is a rarity usually conducted by lone individuals from outside the community. There are many successful examples from across the globe in which SVGs cooperate with governments and ESAs to coordinate disaster activities (Whittaker et al. 2014).

Barriers and Restrictions for Spontaneous Volunteers

A survey conducted by the Red Cross post Black Saturday, revealed neglected offers of aid as more than 22,000 spontaneous volunteers offered their assistance after the 2009 Victorian Bushfires (Cottrell 2011). Few spontaneous volunteers offers were taken up and vast human resources were re-directed to manage them (Volunteering Geelong 2016). Many volunteers received no acknowledgement of their offer of assistance, which damaged the organisation's reputation (Cottrell 2011). This situation highlights how when participation is done poorly, power is not shared, skills are not valued and there are excessive barriers for people to contribute, the backlash can be extremely detrimental and create greater challenges for ESAs to operate in communities (Lowe & Fothergill 2003). A lack of trust in non "experts", perceived unnecessary bureaucracy 'red tape' as well as a lack of connection by ESAs and governments, can put the community off-side (Department of State Development, Business and Innovation, Emergency Management Victoria 2014). People do not sign up to deal with bureaucracy, and an unwillingness to be flexible can often result in a decline in offers of assistance (EMV 2014). Negative volunteering experiences can discourage people leading to a reduced long-term capacity for resilience (PoLF 2002). SVGs such as the Student Volunteer Army in Christchurch often come up against authorities unappreciative of their value (Hayward 2013). The greatest challenge to the success of the army was overcoming bureaucratic barriers to allow people to contribute to their own resilience (Fitzpatrick 2012).

Volunteer Intentions

Overwhelmingly the literature points to volunteers being motivated by their own pain and suffering, their need to release stress, a feeling of desperately needing to help others and their involvement can aid their physical and psychological recovery (Lowe & Fothergill 2003; Fernandez et al. 2006; Frish & Gerrard 1981, O'Brien & Mileti 1992). There is also a current trend for, especially younger people, to also be motivated for personal fulfilment and development (Lowe & Fothergill 2003; Fernandez et al. 2006; Frish & Gerrard 1981). In the cases of the Loma Priteta earthquake and the September 11 attacks, there was also personal identification with the disaster, the need to release rage and combating feelings of powerlessness contributing to volunteer's spontaneous involvement (O'Brien & Mileti 1992; Fernandez et al. 2006; Lowe & Fothergill 2003).

Spontaneous Volunteer Benefits

Spontaneous volunteers have been found to facilitate long-term healing and stimulate greater community participation after a traumatic event (Barraket et al. 2013). Spontaneous volunteers often emerge from a perceived gap in ESAs activities and can potentially provide surge capacity required for more frequent disasters (Whittaker et al. 2014). Locals, making up a huge proportion of spontaneous volunteers, are often the best judges of community needs and their local knowledge is essential for the emergency response (Fernandez et al. 2006). Communities should therefore be seen as implementers, rather than uneducated and unable to build their own capacity and self-reliance (McLennan & Handmer 2012a; Tierney et al. 2001). Community-based, local organisations such as churches, schools and sport clubs can form capable groups to represent local values and mobilise local resources through shared responsibility and collective action (McLennan & Handmer 2012a). A range of tasks undertaken by spontaneous volunteers as experienced during the Tasmanian Fires of 2013 can be seen below.




Figure 1: Activities undertaken by the Facebook 'Tassie Fires We Can Help' SVG

Hayward and Whittaker assert that the Christchurch Student Volunteer Army and BlazeAid contributed to a more resilient community as their disaster-response activities of clean-up and reconstructing fences

resulted in sustained services demonstrating capacity for continuing efforts by SVGs. Adapting the model is currently being experimented with globally due to their success (Lewis 2013). The Queensland Mud Army and BlazeAid are grass-root groups that also mobilised community resources to assist in immeasurable clean up and reconstruction efforts post-floods and bushfires, demonstrating enormous capacity for resilience (Whittaker et al. 2014). Technological advances such as volunteer geographic mapping, crowd-sourced information and collaborative situational awareness through the medium of social media allow everyone to share knowledge and mobilise SVGs in disasters (Rogstadius et al. 2013; Open Street Map Foundation 2015, Orloff 2011). Few tools have been extended on a wider participatory base within emergency management due to a mismatch between functionality and needs (Whittaker et al. 2014; Orloff 2011).

Challenges for Community Resilience

The challenge to promote SVG involvement, as groups with capacity to improve community resilience without encumbering ESAs with the responsibility to manage them, is significant (PoLF 2002). Disasters can be chaotic in nature and response strategies that are relevant, improvised, problem-focused and contextually driven, challenge traditional military-style command and control approaches that drive emergency management in Australia (Cottrell 2011). This approach stems from a lack of trust in non-experts, a panic narrative and the need for “someone” to be in charge (Cottrell 2011; Mason 2006). Existing volunteer management plans, that rely upon pre-registration as used by most emergency response agencies, are limited due to their neglect of truly spontaneous volunteers (Fernandez et al. 2006).

A system able to incorporate formal responders, trained volunteers and integrate a large number of spontaneous volunteers would be more valuable due to the inevitable mass convergence upon disaster sites (Fernandez et al. 2006; Alvinus et al. 2010). Dynes 1980 suggests a new model of continuity, coordination and cooperation could facilitate greater collaboration, decision-making and communication between partners, agencies and organisations as well as expand possibilities for SVGs (Dynes 1980; PoLF 2002; Alvinus et al. 2010). Creating greater networks, links and collaborative processes can help bridge the gaps between bureaucratic agencies providing structure and coordination and those that arise spontaneously (Kapuca 2006; Waugh & Streib 2006; Wise 2006). Allowing SVGs to contribute to the response may also lead to them being engaged in other phases of the disaster including recovery and preparedness (O’Brien et al. 1992).

CHAPTER THREE: Research Approach

Spontaneous volunteer individuals are understudied within the literature and SVGs even more so (Tiernery et al. 2001); therefore study seeks to examine the following:

Aim

The aim of this study is to investigate the role of spontaneous volunteer groups in strengthening community disaster resilience.

As the research surrounding the benefits, concerns and restrictions of using spontaneous volunteers is reasonably well documented, this study seeks to address the following:

Objective

The objective of this research is to determine the ways in which SVGs and ESAs can better work together to build more resilient communities.

Key Questions

This study aims to answer the following research questions:

Can spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to more disaster resilient communities and more flexible emergency service organisations? If so how?

-> Sub-research question one:

Can and do spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to community disaster resilience? How?

-> Sub-research question two:

How can emergency services agencies best support and facilitate spontaneous volunteer organisations?

-> Sub-research question three:

What pre-planned initiatives and future actions could potentially be undertaken by the emergency service agencies to better prepare for the emergence of spontaneous organisations? What are the implications of translating this into practice?

Research Methods:

The lack of previous studies specifically on SVGs merits a qualitative, context-driven research approach from a pragmatist viewpoint utilising open-ended questions. This approach is problem-driven occurring in the particular context of severe disaster events where traditional services are most often overwhelmed. The study seeks to establish the meaning and future management and engagement processes for the phenomenon of SVGs from the views of the selected interviewees.

Development of Research Questions:

Considering the absent established theory base, the key questions were developed to be open-ended, by examining gaps within the literature and utilising the extensive knowledge of the supervisors. Sub-research question one relates directly to the theory base suggesting that greater community engagement and involvement leads to more resilient communities. Sub questions two and three seek to determine how ESAs and SVGs can coordinate a disaster response that shares responsibility. Therefore, a qualitative approach to data collection in the form of semi – structured interviews is taken. A mix of set questions and questions specific to particular organisations were developed and anecdotal evidence collected in order to examine the key question.

The sub-research questions were subsequently broken down into smaller questions, found in appendix two, in order to guide interviews to explore the questions in detail. The interviewees were separated into three distinct groups, seen in appendix four, and asked the relevant set of smaller questions tailored to their experience and role within the disaster.

The interviewees were selected considering: their involvement in disasters with known examples of SVGs; their position as senior members of ESAs, CSOs or SVGs; their proximity to known large-scale disaster events in Australia and New Zealand; their prominent roles in the creating and development of SVGs; a mix of attitudes and their wealth of experience in the field. The interviewees were affiliated with one of the three research supervisors in a professional capacity therefore were able to make introductions, in person or via e-mail. Everyone agreed to the initial request, excepting the State Manager of SES, who passed the interview along to a colleague more involved in volunteer management. The interviews were conducted in 50 – 80 minutes, face-to-face, via telephone or Skype.

A more detailed understanding of the agencies, organisations and individuals interviewed can be found in appendix one.

Scope/Scale:

Eight individuals were selected from a range of SVGs, CSOs and ESAs across a number of states in Australia, as well as New Zealand. This study will look at the potential for spontaneous volunteer involvement within all disaster phases of preparedness, response and recovery.

Data Sources:

Interviews from interview participants available in Appendix 4. Other forms of data collected include secondary sources such as journal articles, books, blogs, websites, presentations, policy documents, handbooks and previous studies.

Data Collection and Analysis:

The data collected from the interviews was recorded, stored and analysed to determine whether community resilience has appeared to be strengthened through the use of SVGs. The interviews were transcribed and grouped into emergent themes. Resultant generalised and specific themes were discussed and interpreted in reference to the criteria set out in the 2015 Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy, in an inductive style, to determine which suggested actions, according to the interviewees, could realistically be expanded upon. These results will establish potential recommended actions in addition to the strategy to be incorporated into disaster management. The feasibility and likelihood of recommendations uptake will require further analysis.

Position of Researcher:

One aspect drawing me to the emergency management sector was its reliance on volunteers and how volunteering often brings out the best in people. However, as a student I have often experienced restrictions in the ways I can contribute due to a perceived lack of skills and experience. As someone who is widely involved in volunteering and looking for these restrictions to be eased, I acknowledge this perspective may impact research outcomes.

Limitations:

Due to the restriction of 10,000 words, it was feasible to conduct only a small number of interviews and from key members of ESAs, SVGs and CSOs. In doing so, there will be limits to the opinions expressed. Other limitations include few known SVGs cases, minimal theory base and published materials, the lack of

ability to directly compare SVGs emerging from differing contexts although they all materialise within chaotic environments. As all interviewees agreed to be recorded and quoted they may have refrained from giving completely honest opinions and the literature is heavily weighted in favour of spontaneous volunteers potentially further exacerbating bias. Another fundamental limitation is the context-driven research approach and use of story-based evidence making it difficult to be statistically relevant and make direct conclusions.

However, if the approach taken were to gain experiences and opinions from less prominent organisation members there would be less scope for gaining insight into recommendation feasibility. Conducting industry-based research ensures the research is grounded in practical realities. The extensive past roles and experiences of the interviewees, as seen in appendix one, within agencies adds greater weight to the diversity and accuracy of their opinions. They have an in-depth understanding of the wider emergency service system, have participated in numerous disaster events all over Australia and New Zealand and possess an extensive grasp on managerial realities and strategic priorities.

CHAPTE FOUR: Discussion

The literature proposes that there are social and physical aspects to a resilient community, and allowing people to contribute to resilience building is a more sustainable option for future communities with capacity to cope with worsening climactic events in Australia. In this section the key research questions will be discussed in reference to the experiences and valuable insights provided by the interviewees.

Modest engagement with Spontaneous Volunteers by the Emergency Management Sector due to barriers and restrictions

It is clear that emergencies today overwhelm existing community resources and there is significant value in ensuring communities have capacity to respond to future challenges (Byatt & Sudholz 2016). Larger more frequent, complex and expensive disasters are compounded by a patchy decline in traditional volunteering and inadequate resources (Leadbeater 2016). Therefore, there must be a fundamental shift in encouraging and allowing shared responsibility for resilience (Irons, Leadbeater & Molloy 2016). ESAs can't do it all as seen during recent large-scale disaster events (Butler & Davis 2016). The trend is that SVGs will become more of the norm due to this generation's access and willingness to use self-mobilising technology, however there are generational issues with the use of this technology within ESAs and concerns over over-reliance on unsupported means of communication (Byatt 2016). The public is time poor and simply because people aren't specifically trained in emergency management, it doesn't mean they can't help their community prepare, respond and recover from disasters (Irons, Leadbeater & Molloy 2016). Without ESAs engagement, affected communities will be caught between top-down and bottom-up responses (Irons & Leadbeater 2016).

Concerns

The main concerns promoted by the interviewees in regards to incorporating SVGs into the emergency management sector reflect those highlighted in the literature. There are concerns around: liability – who is responsible when things go wrong, insurance clarity, police checks, a lack of appropriate gear and clothing, little understanding of safety and risk assessment (Byatt & Sudholz 2016). ESAs fear being sued and references to SVGs being covered by the currently untested Emergency Management Act are vague (Leadbeater 2016). Sudholz contends that the ability and resources of ESAs to quickly and accurately test spontaneous volunteers skills is one of the fundamental barriers to their greater use.

Emergency operation centres established in the aftermath of disaster events can attract people looking to take advantage of the chaotic environment and vulnerable people (Byatt, Molloy & Sudholz 2016). When

spontaneous volunteers, who haven't been vetted and screened, are involved there can be reports and accusations of looting resulting in upset community members and this was seen after the Mud Army clean up in Queensland (Byatt 2016). For these reasons, many ESAs find it too risky to issue blue cards to spontaneous volunteers restricting their involvement. Unintended consequences of the actions of SVGs are seen as the Mud Army destroyed evidence of flood damaged properties in their clean up. Insurance companies made it difficult for people to make claims and the government had to intervene (Byatt 2016). This example highlights an inability of ESAs and government to control and plan for all elements of this type of response. A single negative incident can colour the opinions of ESAs towards SVGs (Irons 2016). Nevertheless Kevin Butler of BlazeAid argues that if you only have one bad egg in every 200 then the benefits outweigh the associated problems.

The potential for SVGs to counteract the mission of ESAs is seen as a real threat as minimising loss of life by being prepared with safety is a key message for ESAs (Byatt & Sudholz 2016). Byatt mentions an example during the 2011 Queensland floods where few within the Mud Army considered the potential for solar powered electrical hazards within floodwaters. This resulted in the Queensland Police rapidly keeping volunteers safe with ad hoc procedures (Byatt 2016). This demonstrates ESA's potential for flexibility. Spontaneous volunteers often see only immediate needs resulting in their involvement in unhelpful and highly risky activities, for instance water rescues, potentially placing trained staff and volunteer at greater risk (Byatt & Davis 2016). The emergence of many SVGs with narrow goals, can restrict their ability to grasp an understanding of the entire emergency management system, inhibiting the overall response and strategic approach (Leadbeater 2016). Other potential problems highlighted include a lack of accountability; *"we don't have SVGs in witness boxes at royal commissions"* (Leadbeater, 09 March, 2016). This combination of challenges within a complex emergency environment can create situations where competing agendas can make situations worse (Leadbeater 2016).

Barriers

The restrictions preventing SVG involvement within the emergency management system appear to stem from a rigidity and inflexibility supported by a lack of resources and understanding.

Even though ESA are, for the most part, aware of the inevitability of SVGs forming, there are concerns about the capacity for ESAs and councils to properly manage all the uncontrollable elements of SVGs (Byatt, Davis & Sudholz 2016). The extent to which people can be useful is determined by the structures that can support and coordinate their efforts (Leadbeater 2016) and all interviewees agree this is currently lacking. The existing formal arrangements often aren't communicated effectively to communities by ESAs and governments therefore the energy of SVGs is not channelled or connected effectively (Molloy 2016). Currently, Volunteering Victoria is attempting to provide SVGs with a volunteer manager at the local level

to act as a link between the formal and informal systems (Davis 2016). Byatt contends that the Mud Army was an effective way to mobilise people for that scale of tragedy however laments the lack of control infrastructure to manage it. ESAs mention concerns of reduced traditional trained volunteers numbers as they question why they bother training if people can contribute spontaneously (Davis 2016). All interviewees highlighted the critical importance of continuing support of traditional volunteers. They lament the lack of guidance, structure and recommended actions better SVG consideration within national policies and procedures would provide.

Numerous interviewees reinforced frustrations established within the literature. The restrictions facing those wishing to form SVGs include: mindsets and power dynamics within the emergency management sector; difficulties of deployment, connection back into the command and coordination systems; minimal engagement with resources like social media and inflexible volunteering models. Essentially innovative SVGs challenge traditional models and bureaucratic command and control cultures, potentially diminishing the sense of expertise within the sector (Davis, Irons & Leadbeater 2016). *“Our sector really needs to look at our culture that sometimes pushes people away instead of working on ensuring people are contributing”* (Davis, 03 March 2016). Molloy highlights vast amounts of underutilised social capital due to narrow mindsets restricting the potential for alternative forms of volunteering. *“ESAs often perceive spontaneous volunteers as people who rock up in thongs therefore hold the position that they will only use traditional volunteers, however then we get a logistic expert wishing to help. They demand working with children checks for those working nowhere near children”* (Molloy, 29 March 2016). ESAs find it difficult to maximise the potential of SVGs when there is little engagement with their motivations for emerging (Leadbeater & Sudholz 2016). *“We lump them together like we lump together impacted people”* (Leadbeater, 09 March 2016). Molloy sees it as the responsibility for Volunteering QLD to help ESAs to understand volunteer motivations as well as how to cater for that type of volunteering to increase within ESAs.

There appears to be a widespread understanding and experience of the vast challenges SVGs nevertheless the reality of Australia’s disaster climate is making obvious the need for shared responsibility and greater policy action to support it. The National Spontaneous Volunteer strategy, underpinned by the notion that the responsibility for disaster resilience is a shared one, is challenged by the notion that people aren’t allowed to help; *“we can’t aspire to a disaster resilient community without allowing people to demonstrate their resilience”*(Leadbeater 09 March, 2016). It is important to identify shared values and possess a genuine interest in shared responsibility to increase resilience meaningfully for communities (Molloy 2016).

Potential benefits for communities

The interviews yielded divided opinions as to whether spontaneous volunteers are being utilised appropriately. *“We are starting to see more as an opportunity and resource we can draw on”* however there are still councils holding views that they won’t engage with them despite the inevitability of their emergence (Leadbeater, 09 March, 2016). Despite the challenges, numerous interviewees highlighted the huge untapped potential for SVGs, if adequately supported and encouraged, to contribute to community disaster resilience.

In a rapidly changing society, SVGs have incredible potential to innovate and challenge traditional methods (Davis, Johnston & Molloy 2016). They present an opportunity to analyse the existing adaptive capacities in communities, build valuable skills and assess community needs (Leadbeater & Molloy 2016). The Queensland floods illuminated a beneficial example of a spontaneous response although ESAs systems weren’t sufficient to adequately cope with it (Byatt 2016). The interviewees emphasised how even small actions have immeasurable benefits for impacted communities to build social capital, for example socks and jumpers knitted for burnt Koalas (Irons & Leadbeater 2016). They expressed an understanding of the importance of community empowerment for affected persons to recovery psychologically, deal with trauma and gain valuable volunteering experiences. Byatt expressed concerns that further involvement in traumatic events can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, although Leadbeater highlights the potential for this for all trained and untrained staff and volunteers.

An essential component of increasing community resilience, as endorsed within the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, is promoting constructive relationships with communities whereas they have some level of control over the decision-making (COAG 2011). Often governments and ESAs who are not adequately integrated with communities can create tension if they don’t sufficiently take community priorities into consideration (Butler 2016). ESAs must ensure: existing community resources are utilised; strong relationships are formed and adequately maintained with existing and emergent groups; local leaders are engaged and their goals are aligned with communities (Iron & Leadbeater 2016). BlazeAid is a SVG that aligns itself with local priorities by integrating themselves into the community. BlazeAid participates in local BBQs, spends money locally to support the disaster-affected communities, forms lasting community connections, promotes neighbourly support and invites inclusive involvement in resilience building by utilising community-members good-will to feed volunteers (Butler 2016). BlazeAid’s holistic approach can be demonstrated by their engagement with schools and students and by the fact that they always leave community facilities they use in a better condition than when they entered.

Although the activities of Butler's BlazeAid and Johnston's Student Army were mostly the physical rebuilding of fences and cleaning up of silt and liquefaction, they identified the psychological support, provided by injecting a vast number of enthusiastic and well-intentioned volunteers into a impacted community, as the most important aspect of their involvement. Irons highlights the importance of people having mediums to express their gratitude, fears and concerns during disaster events, and her Facebook We Can Help Tassie page provided opportunity for people to be motivated and inspired by the activities of others. *"Spontaneous volunteering can have either very obvious and powerful consequences or just more subtle but nevertheless important affects for the community"* (Irons, 25 March, 2016). Building these sorts of relationship is important for ESAs to consider in advance of disaster events, when less focused on their on essential activities, to build trust within communities and to save time during response (Irons 2016). Irons highlights her own naivety as the leader of a SVG as a strength allowing her to focus on what had to be done instead of being paralysed by the liability and restrictions. *"Anything seemed possible.... I was in the right place at the right time to things got done in a direct, rapid and non-wasteful as I was able to supervise everything"* (Irons 2016). This example highlights the benefits of SVGs less restricted by bureaucracy.

Engaging with SVGs could also provide an opportunity for ESAs to translate spontaneous volunteering into longer-term traditional volunteering commitments addressing declining volunteer numbers while the interest is there (Byatt, Davis & Sydholz 2016). Molloy provides numerous examples of spontaneous volunteers contributing in ongoing capacities, who emerged as a direct result of disasters. *"It's about enabling a connection and allowing people to pursue their interests"* (Molloy, 29 March 2016).

Overcoming barriers - paths to community resilience and shared responsibility

This section will discuss opportunities for ESAs to support and facilitate SVGs as well as potential actions that could be undertaken by ESAs to better prepare for spontaneous volunteer convergence.

Roles

The roles and resources for spontaneous volunteer individuals and groups need to be planned for in advance (Molloy 2016). For the most part volunteers are happy to do whatever if they consider themselves to be contributing (Molloy 2016). Within ESAs, there is huge emphasis placed on matching volunteers to roles and rightly so, not all roles are suitable for spontaneous volunteers, nor should they be, and often expert training is required (Molloy 2016). Yet roles can be broken down for spontaneous volunteers, they don't have to be all-encompassing experts (Molloy 2016). *"If superman appears on your doorstep, you're not going to tell him to just take some incoming calls"* (Molloy, 29 March, 2016). Some roles Volunteering Queensland has created for spontaneous volunteers include: technological systems support, social media,

educational campaigns, trainer facilitation, administration and spontaneous volunteers registration (Molloy 2016). The extra work and inconveniences that accompany the use of spontaneous volunteers can be mitigated through greater use of spontaneous volunteers. An example where this could be applied is the insurance claim example mentioned earlier where the Mud Army destroyed evidence whilst cleaning up. SVGs could easily photograph everything before the clean-up if experienced ESAs quickly identify the issues. It's about being creative with roles. There are often huge amounts of work not vital for the disasters that are low-risk but important that can build community skills and make impactful differences to the community (Johnston 2016). It is not ok for agencies to reject sandbagging assistance because they're not trained; it's not difficult and inappropriate to refuse contributions in this area especially when ESAs are clearly overwhelmed (Irons, Leadbeater, Molloy 2016). *"We have found that there's always a job for everyone so long as they're healthy and have a positive attitude"* (Butler, 10 March, 2016). What may be required is on-the-spot training to ensure safety. *"It is actually our job to task them properly and send them to the right location, otherwise it's an unutilised capacity, you don't want 1000 people turning up to the same house"* (Davis, 03 March 2016).

'On-the-spot-training'

CFA and SES currently don't engage with on-the-spot training of spontaneous volunteers although Davis at EMV contends that ESAs have a responsibility to reinforce basic safety principles and could do this by conducting rapid, simple training exercises. There is no doubt there are real risks working in emergencies, as seen with a lady in Queensland who suffered septicaemia after a leg cut in floodwaters (Davis 2016). Leadbeater continually reiterates the inevitability of SVG emergency; therefore training processes must be in place to rapidly prepare volunteers to be of most use. Johnston promotes technology to send key information and messaging to vast numbers of people. Molloy challenges ESAs to be more flexible and to ensure they have roles people can walk off the street and contribute to.

Building Trust

An important barrier to overcome for ESAs is putting faith in unknown, un-trialled, untested groups and fairly so. ESAs would like SVGs that form during disasters to demonstrate legitimacy fairly quickly by: ensuring they have plans and goals; demonstrating an ability to follow safety instructions; collaborating and showing an appreciation for the complexities of the emergency management system; being prepared to negotiate; not competing with each other and possessing a commitment to 'do no harm' (Butler, Byatt, Davis, Irons Molloy & Sudholz 2016). *"Spontaneous volunteering works if you're seen to be credible, proactive and dedicated to the people you're supposed to be helping"* (Irons, 25 March 2016). BlazeAid demonstrates trustworthiness both to ESAs and to communities by ensuring promised are kept and jobs are completed (Butler 2016). BlazeAid is now supported heavily by SES staff and volunteers (Butler & Sudholz 2016). Johnston suggests contributing to something small and doing it really well, being predictable

and transparent in activities and communication. Irons ensured her Facebook group gained legitimacy quickly by contacting relevant ESAs, the national media and showing her interest in collaborating as much as possible. Building and maintaining trust must be reciprocal and ESAs must demonstrate a willingness to listen and an interest in identifying opportunities for SVGs (Leadbeater 2016).

ESAs would like to see potential volunteers consider volunteering before disasters and undertaking traditional methods of registration and training, however this isn't the nature of spontaneous volunteers and whether or not there are sufficient levels of traditional volunteers; spontaneous volunteers will still present managerial challenges.

Information Dissemination

ESAs have a responsibility to provide support in the form of greater knowledge exchange; disaster awareness, sharing expertise and ensuring decision-making processes are explained responsibly to the public (Davis & Johnston 2016). Without clear and responsible messaging and information sharing, people inadvertently make situations worse (Leadbeater 2016). Without this it is difficult for communities to gauge how the response is going, legitimate community requirements and whether their assistance is required (Leadbeater & Molloy 2016). Communities have the right to accurate information and when Anna Bligh stated that financial assistance was required over donations during the Queensland floods she explained clearly the reasoning behind the decision leading to less public outrage (Leadbeater 2016).

Social Media

The way information is shared within disasters is changing as seen with the proliferation of social media; governments are no longer information gatekeepers (Irons 2016). There are concerns about arming the community with information however well informed communities can make more sensible decisions (Irons 2016). There is immense potential due to sheer numbers on the ground to capture information and social capital in disasters, therefore ESAs must be skilled in the use of social media (Davis & Irons 2016). Queensland Police during the floods embraced social media in a "*ground-breaking leap of faith*" despite a lack of procedures in place to deal with the Mud Army, revealing the potential for coordination on-the-run to be successful (Molloy 2016). "*Their ability to be agile was high however they were on the run all the time*" (Byatt 2016). Although Queensland Police did a sound job ensuring safety and coordination of the Mud Army, it did highlight the need for better social media practices and online information monitoring within ESAs (Irons 2016).

Education

Providing disaster volunteering education and training to improve community resilience appeared to be a consistent theme expressed amongst all interviewees, although there were distinctions in what this could or should look like.

If the emergence of SVGs is going to be an ongoing phenomenon, there needs to be some base-level training programs in place to ensure expectations are managed and perceptions of the work is accurately reflected (Davis 2016). Byatt promotes the need for education and core training on a national scale in schools to embed skills early in life and to have an understanding of the risks and responsibilities associated with being a disaster volunteer. A Red Cross statistic contends that you are three times more likely to be helped by a neighbour or passer-by in the aftermath of a disaster than ESAs, therefore Byatt questions what skills have we provided people with to put them in a good place to provide that aid? The general population is not aware of the risks in floodwaters, seeing floods as merely mud and water, neglecting the potential for biohazards from rotting food and animals and minimal understanding of risks can compound volunteer and community safety (Byatt 2016).

Irons illuminates the need for social media education for older generations within ESAs. Johnston backs this up highlighting that there is little training available for people working in the sector to understand SVGs motivations and when to and not to engage them. Leadbeater and Molloy advocate for improved processes to ensure; SVGs are aware of the commitment required; they are linking with groups, agencies and services for support and are connecting them with a liaison to improve communication. Johnston promotes shared responsibility and encourages SVG coaching rather than controlling to ensures the project is theirs, they are motivated but supported to be effective.

Coordination & Cooperation

There seems to be no clear idea of what better coordination and cooperation looks like however consistent themes arose. *"We should not try and turn our ESAs and governments into these types of SVGs but rather invest in and facilitate these groups to do what they do well"* (Davis, 03 March 2016).

The emergency management sector is a high stakes environment; therefore helping SVGs to deliver value is essential (Leadbeater 2016). Byatt and Davis state that the CFA and SES, as the major ESAs in Australia, should attempt to broaden their platforms to embrace more SVGs viewing it as a way to inform and resource people for future safety. It is not the sole responsibility of ESAs to coordinate; nonetheless they can provide loose advice on how facilitators can make the most of mobilised volunteers (Johnston 2016). Cooperation may appear in the form of the Mud Army where there was no way for ESAs to stop it, therefore simple ad hoc safety frameworks were put in place (Byatt 2016). There needs to be a balance

struck between allowing SVGs to do what they do best with little ESA or government interference and allowing a free for all with hundreds of groups forming and competing over tasks (Johnston 2016). Byatt and Sudholz suggest that placing command and control and situational planning approaches over SVGs may be too difficult, unpredictable and futile when social-media based, therefore they would not be confident in the rigor of this approach. Although Byatt acknowledges that sometimes, for example after an earthquake having sheer number involved in rescue can save lives, they could also be doing more harm than good. However there are few examples where harm has outweighed benefits. The CFA's approach would therefore most likely be to provide leadership and direction for to achieve desirable outcomes (Byatt 2016).

Irons says that just having the knowledge that ESAs were watching her activities from the sidelines provided her with confidence that she was doing the right thing, therefore there is need for alternative levels of cooperation subject to the disaster context, community needs and SVG aims and goals. *"We want really practical suggestions on how we can work together"* (Molloy, 29 March, 2016). Johnston mentions a scrum model of cooperation and coordination where diverse people come together to solve problems, mobilise volunteers and share resources and ideas leading to shared decision-making. A full time liaison officer between ESAs and SVGs contributes significantly to facilitating but not controlling SVG activities although there is potential for key person risk if staff members leave their current jobs (Irons 2016). These relationships need to be formed and maintained to ensure local leaders are respected (Molloy 2016).

One view of the best strategy for SVG management currently would be to invest in the capacity of Volunteering Australia (Davis 2016), although SVGs are still guaranteed to form. Therefore a multi-faceted, flexible approach to SVG arrangements must be taken to evenly distribute responsibilities. Molloy currently demonstrates Volunteering Queensland's ability to provide a buffer between spontaneous volunteers and ESAs to match needs with skills and volunteers and also to help ESAs identify roles within their organisations that spontaneous volunteers can contribute to.

Complete risk avoidance reduces community disaster resilience

The essential question this paper attempts to identify is whether SVGs strengthen community disaster resilience and there appears to be an argument to contend that complete risk avoidance reduces resilience (Irons, Johnston, Leadbeater, Molloy, 2016).

Disasters present an opportunity to look at what we value as humans, not just strict processes and how that can be reflected that in our approach to spontaneous volunteering (Molloy 2016). *"The more structures and rules I applied to the group the less it will be able to fulfil the things it is able to fulfil"* (Irons,

25 March 2016). Volunteering Queensland is dedicated to the greater utilisation of all types of volunteering and in 2011 was controversially involved with a Facebook SVG called Baked Relief, a crowd-sourcing feeding of the people. The controversy stemmed from minimal consideration of health and safety although Volunteering Queensland displayed signs saying, “People volunteered to make this food - eat at your own risk” and allowed people to make educated decisions (Molloy 2016). Loosening controls allowed many to contribute who otherwise would not have been unable to.

Communities more or less facilitated to take on their own recovery can be highly resilient, however the overreliance on governments and ESAs coming in has made them reliant on external help (Irons 2016). We no longer encourage communities to go out and fight fires, due to the high levels of potential harm, although communities were arguably more self-reliant then (Byatt 2016). There are some communities that are incredibly resilient and defend their neighbour’s homes in a bushfire (Sudholz 2016), however there is a resilience disparity across Australia and without formal emergency training, we are less confident in the fundamental knowledge and skills we could use within communities (Byatt 2016).

Although the interviewees agreed that SVGs certainly have the potential to contribute to community disaster resilience and overcoming these barriers was explored in the previous sections, what form this contribution could take varied. SVGs do not always contribute to resilience building due to either a lack of support or their own failings (Leadbeater 2016). It is dependent on how well they are tapped into and coordinated as to how effective they can be (Leadbeater 2016). *“It’s motivating and powerful to contribute and it’s good for community social resilience”* (Davis, 03 March 2016). Shared experience and pain can create connections, skills and networks for future events (Davis, Leadbeater 2016). Butler sees 10-20% repeatable volunteers at BlazeAid and receives overwhelmingly positive feedback. Volunteering Queensland has seen a 92% retention to be matched to roles on a “call me when you need me” basis (Molloy 2016). Flexible and convenient models of volunteering allow people to contribute in an ongoing capacity if they see the relevance for them. BlazeAid contributes to resilience not just by rebuilding fences but building bridges for the community to form lasting connections between farmers, community members and volunteers so they are in a better position to deal with future events. One unexpected contribution BlazeAid volunteers have made to communities has been their contribution to help farmers deal with depression and hopelessness in the face of great adversity. Butler has found that recipients of BlazeAid assistance often feel a duty and obligation to keep their heads above water and get their farms back on tract due to the overwhelming good will of volunteers.

Whether these factors contribute to real community disaster resilience is difficult to say with certainty. Although it does confirm that many people contribute again and again, form lasting relationships,

partnerships, connections and networks highlighting many of the criteria set out in the key definition stated previously for communities form stronger social connections to deal with shocks and stresses.

SVGs have the potential to become fit-for-purpose for specific disasters (Davis 2016). To address safety concerns Irons, Johnston and Molloy employ ESAs to highlight a small number of critical, readily understandable rules for groups to operate within. Do not to do anything illegal, do not to do anything unsafe, otherwise get on with it - this is an approach endorsed by Bob Jensen, FEMA (Irons 2016). Ensuring these rules aren't too restrictive is important otherwise volunteer motivation is stifled (Johnston 2016). Educating the public and injecting basic knowledge is essential in a format that is readily accessible, not in the form of documents and policies about excess donations for example, that are impossible to digest in demanding circumstances (Irons 2016).

Good volunteer management practices are essential to retain and encourage greater levels of volunteerism and communities (Molloy 2016). BlazeAid is very successful as it allows people to have an unique experience, offers diverse opportunities and roles and quickly sets up and tasks volunteers to reduce the risk of losing volunteer interest and availability (Butler & Davis 2016). There is usually a drop off in volunteer interest after three to five days post-disaster. ESAs, within their community resilience strategies, still insist on lengthy formal recruiting, application and training of all volunteers (Sudholz 2016) potentially losing volunteer interest. Forward planning within the sector however is difficult, as there is little ability to prepare early, it's about responding to crises (Butler & Davis 2016). Butler attempted to organise locations for BlazeAid camps with every council before disasters occurred to save time and effort during the response, however gained no council feedback. We can do a lot of work in advance (Davis & Leadbeater 2016). There is a strong argument for ensuring we set ourselves up to maximise the value, minimise the risk and gain contributions from SVGs (Leadbeater 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE: Recommendations & Conclusions

This section will comprise of a summary of propositions revealed within the discussion points. It will highlight which of the suggested actions detailed on page four of the Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy in Figure 2 could be expanded.

Overview of Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy

Figure 1 provides an overview of the goal, objectives and principles that comprise the Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy together with a summary of the suggested actions for jurisdictions and emergency management agencies. Please see page 18 for further details and policy considerations.




Figure 2: Overview of Spontaneous Volunteer Strategy

Recommendations

Empowered individuals and communities

1. Consider the management of spontaneous volunteers in recovery plans and budgets; invest more in existing systems of Volunteering Australia.
2. Recognise the inevitability of the emergency of spontaneous volunteers and prepare early. Develop an extensive, diverse range of roles and resources required for these activities in advance. Ensure agencies are set up to maximise the value and minimise the risks of diverse contributions. Seek assistance from your state volunteering body to help match needs with volunteers and provide guidance in identifying adequate roles within your agency.
3. Invest in improved integration into communities before disasters to build trust by: including existing community groups in pre-event recovery planning and exercising; utilisation of existing community resources that may be struggling post-disaster; building strong, sustainable relationships with existing and emergent groups and local leaders and align agency goals with local values and priorities.
4. Review existing legislation that addresses risk and liability for spontaneous volunteers. Develop simple 'on-the-spot' training information and exercises to reinforce basic safety principles in a creative and technologically relevant manner.

Efficient and effective coordination of spontaneous volunteers

1. Train and educate staff and formal volunteers working in the sector to better understand spontaneous volunteer motivations for emerging, their potential to build social capital as well as what engaging them entails. Incorporate guidance for staff and volunteers to determine when and when not to engage emergent SVGs. Develop scalable processes that reflect the motivations of spontaneous volunteers.
2. Provide clear information and responsible messaging about how the needs of people affected by the disaster are being met within the official response to all society members. This allows individuals and groups to make informed decisions concerning gaps in services and whether additional assistance is required and wanted by affected persons. Provided the public with the information they need to ensure SVGs and ESAs aren't competing and doubling up on tasks. Ensure knowledge and skills are better shared with SVGs to channel volunteerism energy, expand possibilities for SVGs. Allow diverse people to come together to cooperate to solve problems, mobilise volunteerism, make decisions and share resources to forge better lasting relationships with communities made more resilient for the next disaster event.

3. Register spontaneous volunteers and monitor their safety and wellbeing

4. Integrate arrangements for spontaneous volunteers into existing emergency management plans to ensure large numbers of spontaneous volunteers can deliver valuable assistance together with formal responders and trained volunteers. SVG liaison officers should be designated to facilitate, guide and monitor but not control SVG activities to allow them create sustained efforts for community resilience.

Satisfied volunteers who may continue to volunteer in the emergency management sector

1. Recognise the inevitable nature of spontaneous volunteering and promote a shift in restrictive mindsets amongst staff and trained volunteers. Promote an inclusive culture much more supportive of failure and possess a willingness to admit failure in order to achieve greater levels of genuine shared responsibility for community disaster resilience. This involves a delegation of power from ESAs to allow individuals and groups to build their capacity to contribute.

2. Provide training and guidelines for individuals and emergent groups who may spontaneously volunteer to inject basic disaster knowledge into communities in a readily ingestible and accessible format. Provide guidance and coaching for SVGs to ensure they're aware of the commitment and support required to work in the field, to reduce the likelihood of burnout, and connect them with existing relevant services, ideas and knowledge. Inject into the groups expert advice to ensure their work is well guided however allow them to emerge in their own flavour so they can contribute appropriately to the specific needs and context.

3. Create more flexible and convenient volunteering models and ensure effective follow-up and referral to cater for that type of volunteering to increase. Look for opportunities to develop procedures for spontaneous volunteers to transition to formal volunteering roles if they see the relevance in continuing. Inform potential volunteers of a range of opportunities and experiences to contribute to their community's resilience throughout all phases of the disaster cycle including preparedness, response and recovery.

4. Develop communication plans in advance and key messages including the use of social media in all phases of disasters. Develop social media practices and equip all staff and volunteers with skills to communicate information to wider audiences, engage wider audiences as well as to monitor information in real time. Look at the potential to advance technological advancements to capture more disaster information through instantaneous globalised platforms.

Conclusions: Building self-efficacy and volunteering culture in all its forms

This study, in advocating for greater uses of spontaneous volunteers, does not intend to promote the community as exclusively responsible for their own resilience and acknowledges managerial issues.

Nonetheless, it promotes a joint and shared response. Working in tandem with ESAs can maximise the resources SVGs provide by making the most of their knowledge, skills and passion (Whittaker et al. 2014). With or without government approval, SVGs will respond and self-deploy (Waugh & Streib 2006). Therefore integration, cooperation and shared responsibility is key in achieving community disaster resilience (Orloff 2011). Communities find ways to persist in the wake of disaster and authorities need to promote this resilience (Bach et al. 2010).

What defines community disaster resilience varies across the sector, although without encouraging involvement how can we encourage community resilience, build on social capital and offer sustained social services in response to disasters? Frequently SVGs do not need to be formalised as it would negate their most powerful attributes, they would no longer be highly spontaneous and risk becoming more affected by 'red tape'. On the other hand, greater structures, predictability and formalisation of successful groups like BlazeAid and the Christchurch Student Volunteer Army allow motivated people to continue to contribute to their community's disaster resilience. There is real need to be flexible in determining how much or little we control community-based initiatives like SVGs.

If the Australian community and emergency service sector is to achieve greater levels of shared responsibility for future risks then a culture supportive of failure and a willingness to admit failure must be developed (Irons 2016). *"We are tiny pawns in Mother Nature's disaster games and we can only do our best within human limitations, we need to be more understanding of what ESAs are going through and that would allow communities to have a better expectations"* (Irons, 25 March 2016). This involves a delegation of power from ESAs and governments to allow individuals and groups with the capacity to contribute to share resilience responsibility (Johnston 2016). The message that there is not going to be a red shiny truck sitting on your doorstep when a fire comes, isn't coming across, therefore ESAs need to be more open and honest about their limitations and stop restricting SVGs from self-organising as these restrictions reduce resilience. This does not mean that SVGs are the sole answer to the ESAs capacity issues, as they possess their own limitations.

This study has highlighted that the political and community will is evident however there is much work to be done on the practicalities of making the most of underutilised community resources. It has demonstrated that much good can come from building social capital thorough flexible volunteering cultures incorporating SVGs. *"We should be encouraging innovation because they might come up with the solution"* (Davis, 03 March 2016).

Appendices

Appendix One: Further details of agencies, organisations and key persons involved in research

Organisation	Organisation Contact/Position:	Agenda	Organisational role	Disaster Phase for Operations	Current Status
Volunteering Queensland Community – based support organisation					
> Commenced in 1982 with International Volunteer Week to raise awareness of volunteering for a movement for social and personal change (Volunteering QLD 2016)	Contact: <u>Julie Molloy</u> Position: <u>Director of Social Engagement</u>	> Keeping community organisations on the political agenda (Volunteering QLD 2016) > Governments recognising and supporting the essential roles local organisations play in nurturing resilient organisations (Volunteering QLD 2016) > A world where everyone can make a difference (Volunteering QLD 2016)	> Lead an organisation solely dedicated to advancing volunteering for the social, cultural and environmental well-being of Queensland (Volunteering QLD 2016) > Engages with spontaneous volunteers by developing systems to recruit and manage spontaneous volunteers (Volunteering QLD 2016) > Provides advice for external organisations on how to best engage and manage spontaneous volunteers for disaster response and recovery (Volunteering QLD 2016) > Developing and managing a volunteer referral service, Emergency Volunteering Community Response to Extreme Weather (EV CREW), where volunteers often spontaneously can be linked to disaster response agencies where required (Volunteering QLD 2016)	> Preparedness Response Relief & Recovery	> Formal Organisation
Queensland Mud Army Spontaneous Volunteer Group					
> Formed with a plea to the community for volunteers from the lord major of Brisbane Cambell Newman resulting in hundreds and thousands of volunteers putting up their hand to help restore order to their community (Arklay 2012)	Contact: <u>Julie Molloy</u> Position: <u>Director of Social Engagement at Volunteering QLD</u> – aided Queensland Council and Police to coordinated much on the ongoing confusion once the council call went out for Mud Army volunteers	> Bottom- up approach to disaster management (Molloy 2016) > Community collaboration a priority (Arklay 2012) > Fostering a sense of community spirit (Arklay 2012)	> A “call to arms” for the community to help out with post-flood clean up (Molloy 2016) > Innovative use of social media by the QLD Police (Macdonald 2012)	> Recovery	> Spontaneous – fixed-term
Christchurch Student Volunteer Army Spontaneous Volunteer Group					
> Initiated following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch. Formed by students who	Contact: <u>Sam Johnston</u> Position:	> Focused on the power of student volunteerism and community engagement (The silt	> Volunteers helping to clean up silt and liquefaction after the 2010 Christchurch earthquake. They	> Initially Recovery – Ongoing Preparedness, Response and Recovery	> Formalised
> Initiated following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch. Formed by students who	Contact: <u>Sam Johnston</u> Position:	> Focused on the power of student volunteerism and community engagement (The silt	> Volunteers helping to clean up silt and liquefaction after the 2010 Christchurch earthquake. They	> Initially Recovery – Ongoing Preparedness, Response and Recovery	> Formalised Author: Gemma Gray - 391111

BlazeAid/BlazeAlert					
Spontaneous Volunteer Group					
<p>> Initiated following the Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria in 2009, Australia. Also active after 2011 floods, Cyclone Yasi and 2013 Tasmanian fires (BlazeAid 2009)</p> <p>> Initiated by two Kilmore East farmers who sought assistance from family, friends and local volunteers to help rebuild fences after the Black Saturday fires. After rebuilding fences within a week, they began helping others who were affected and BlazeAid was born (BlazeAid 2009)</p>	<p>Contact:</p> <p><u>Kevin Butler</u></p> <p>Position:</p> <p><u>Founder</u></p>	<p>> <i>“Not just rebuilding fences, but helping rebuild lives.”</i> (Butler 2016)</p>	<p>> Primarily rebuilding farm fences, clearing paddocks etc Butler 2016)</p> <p>> Volunteers must be aged 12 years and older, as their Volunteer Workers Insurance only covers volunteers aged 12 to 85 years. Any volunteers aged under 18 must be accompanied and supervised by a responsible adult (BlazeAid 2009)</p> <p>> ‘You don’t need any fencing experience, just a willingness to give it a go and learn on the job. You can volunteer for a day or two, or a week or more’ (Butler 2016)</p> <p>BlazeAid has developed a ‘Volunteer Code of Conduct’ that covers: volunteers’ interactions with each other and ‘victims of natural disasters’; safety (including a daily insurance form); and proper use and care of equipment (BlazeAid 2009)</p> <p>> BlazeAlert is a community phone-tree directory where people can self-register to participate. It provides a communication network among rural property owners to alert each other about fires in their area (BlazeAid 2009)</p>	> Recovery	> Formalised
Murrindindi Shire Council & Anne Leadbeater Consulting & Volunteering Victoria					
Community – based support organisations/agency					
<p>> Leadbeater Group specialises in facilitation and engagement, disaster recovery and community resilience</p>	<p>Contact:</p> <p><u>> Anne Leadbeater</u></p> <p>Positions:</p> <p><u>> Strategic Project Manager – Advancing Country Towns Murrindindi Shire Council</u></p> <p><u>> Director at Leadbeater Group Pty Ltd</u></p> <p><u>> Manager Community Engagement Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner</u></p>	<p>> Supporting communities to continue participating in the face of consultation fatigue (Leadbeater Group Pty Ltd 2015)</p> <p>> Easing the burdens of managing spontaneous volunteers on councils (Leadbeater Group Pty Ltd 2015)</p> <p>> Effectively utilising the skills and manpower that spontaneous</p>	<p>> Services include research, strategic planning, policy development and group facilitation. (Leadbeater Group Pty Ltd 2015)</p> <p>> Design, coordination and delivery of disaster recovery programs and services that focus on community resilience (Leadbeater Group Pty Ltd 2015)</p> <p>> Manager of Volunteering Victoria’s pilot program called The Manager of</p>	> Preparedness, Response & Recovery	> Formalised
<p>> Leadbeater Group specialises in facilitation and engagement, disaster</p>	<p>Contact:</p> <p><u>> Anne Leadbeater</u></p>	<p>> Supporting communities to continue participating in the face of</p>	<p>> Services include research, strategic planning, policy development and group</p>	> Preparedness, Response & Recovery	> Formalised

We Can Help Group Tasmania Spontaneous Volunteer Group					
<p>> Initiated in the wake of the devastating 2013 Tasmanian bushfires. Mel created a Facebook page in response to the large amount of information being provided and searched for on social media</p>	<p>Contact: <u>Melanie Irons</u></p> <p>Position: <u>Founder</u></p>	<p>> <i>"I am just an individual, connecting you to anyone from anywhere who is trying to help, whether that be connecting you with other individuals, NFPs, NGOs, charities, businesses or the Government!"</i> (Irons 2014)</p> <p>> Empowering the general population to help out after disaster events (Irons 2016)</p>	<p>> Providing access to help and information even when roads were blocked and there was no power (Irons 2014)</p> <p>> A medium for people to connect and communicate important information (Irons 2014)</p> <p>> Providing a channel for people wanting to help to be connected to those needing help (Irons 2014)</p> <p>> Provided a forum for people to tell their story, share their experiences and receive support (Irons 2014)</p> <p>> Fundraising (Irons 2014)</p>	<p>> Relief</p>	<p>> Spontaneous – fixed term</p>
State Emergency Service (SES) – Victoria Emergency Service Agency					
<p>> Works to ensure the safety of Victorian communities by responding to emergencies and disasters across the state (SES 2013)</p>	<p>Contact: <u>Kaylene Sudholz</u></p> <p>Position: <u>Operations Manager, Emergency Management Planning – Victoria</u></p> <p>PAST EXPERIENCE: <u>EMV, Knox City Council, East Gippsland Shire Council</u></p>	<p>> Safer Communities - Together (SES 2015)</p> <p>> Working in partnership with stakeholders and communities (SES 2015)</p> <p>> VICSES further acknowledges the need to work with communities to strengthen their ability to withstand all types of emergency events (SES 2015)</p>	<p>> Building safer, more resilient communities while delivering on our mission to minimise the loss of life, injuries and damage from emergencies and natural disaster (SES 2015)</p>	<p>> Relief & Recovery</p>	<p>> Formal</p>
Country Fire Authority – Victoria Emergency Service Agency					
<p>> One of the largest volunteer – based organisations in the world with a vision to work together with communities to keep Victorians safe from fire and other emergencies, to protect lives and property (CFA 2014)</p>	<p>Contact: <u>Bruce Byatt</u></p> <p>Position: <u>Deputy Chief Officer at Country Fire Authority – Victoria</u></p> <p>PAST EXPERIENCE: <u>NTFRS, QFRS, DES</u></p>	<p>> It is essential that our efforts embrace a role, which empowers, equips and partners all Victorians to prepare for and survive future emergency events. (CFA 2014)</p> <p>> Together with individuals, communities, industry, government and our emergency service partners, we must achieve a more resilient approach founded upon shared responsibility (CFA 2015)</p>	<p>> Increasing interest in casual volunteering, and volunteering to build skills rather than long-term or time-intensive commitments to ensure the provision of flexible and sustainable volunteering models (CFA 2015)</p> <p>> Reduce the incidence and impact of fire and non fire emergencies on the community (CFA 2014)</p> <p>> Be a highly trusted and respected fire and emergency service (CFA 2014)</p>	<p>Preparedness, Response & Recovery</p>	<p>> Formal</p>

<p>> One of the largest volunteer – based organisations in the world with a vision to work together with communities to keep Victorians safe from fire and other emergencies, to protect lives and property (CFA 2014)</p>	<p>Contact: <u>Bruce Byatt</u></p> <p>Position: <u>Deputy Chief Officer at Country Fire Authority – Victoria</u></p> <p>PAST EXPERIENCE: <u>NTFRS, QFRS, DES</u></p>	<p>> It is essential that our efforts embrace a role, which empowers, equips and partners all Victorians to prepare for and survive future emergency events. (CFA 2014)</p> <p>> Together with individuals, communities, industry, government and our emergency service partners, we must achieve a more resilient approach founded upon shared responsibility (CFA 2015)</p>	<p>> Increasing interest in casual volunteering, and volunteering to build skills rather than long-term or time-intensive commitments to ensure the provision of flexible and sustainable volunteering models (CFA 2015)</p> <p>> Reduce the incidence and impact of fire and non fire emergencies on the community (CFA 2014)</p> <p>> Be a highly trusted and respected fire and emergency service (CFA 2014)</p> <p>> Increase community resilience to fire and non-fire emergencies (CFA 2014)</p>	<p>Preparedness, Response & Recovery</p>	<p>> Formal</p>
<p>Emergency Management Victoria Emergency Service Agency</p>					
<p>> A modern emergency management system for Victoria (EMV 2015)</p>	<p>Contact: <u>Paul Davis</u></p> <p>Position: <u>Program Lead, Behavioural Innovation</u> <u>Manager, Volunteer Development and Change</u></p> <p>PAST EXPERIENCE: <u>Fire Services Commissioner, Plan International Australia</u></p>	<p>> It's all about addressing hazards and working as one; communities, government, agencies and businesses to achieve community focused outcomes with a stronger emphasis on shared responsibility (EMV 2015)</p> <p>> Ensuring that communities are the drivers of resilience supported by and linked in with agencies and government (EMV 2015)</p>	<p>> Community-based emergency management planning and the sector's vision to build safer and more resilient communities (EMV 2015)</p> <p>> Collectively achieve a sustainable and efficient emergency management system (EMV 2015)</p> <p>> Removing barriers that restrict optimal volunteer utilisation (EMV 2015)</p>	<p>> Preparedness, Response, Relief & Recovery</p>	<p>> Formal</p>

Appendix Two: In depth interview questions

<p>KEY RESEARCH QUESTION</p> <p>Can spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to more disaster resilient communities and more flexible emergency service organisations? If so how?</p>
<p>QUESTIONS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICE AGENCIES / COMMUNITY - BASED SUPPORT GROUPS</p>
<p>Sub - research question 1: Can and do spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to community disaster resilience? How?</p>
<p>Minor question a. Do you believe that spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to community disaster resilience? Why/why not?</p>
<p>Minor question b. Is the use of spontaneous volunteers a priority for your organisation?</p>
<p>Minor question c. How would you describe the general perception of spontaneous volunteer organisations within your agency?</p>
<p>Minor question d. What are the main restrictions for the greater use of spontaneous volunteers within your organisation? Does this vary at different times?</p>
<p>Minor question e. In your experience, do spontaneous volunteers tend to continue to volunteer in an ongoing manner or is their commitment short-term?</p>
<p>Minor question f. Do they continue to contribute to community resilience? Why is this?</p>
<p>Sub - research question 2: How can emergency services agencies best support and facilitate spontaneous volunteer organisations?</p>
<p>Minor question a. Tell me about your experience of working with spontaneous volunteer organisations; what have been the main rewards and difficulties?</p>
<p>Minor question b. Have you encountered any problems engaging with spontaneous volunteer organisations and how have you overcome these problems?</p>
<p>Minor question c. What are the difficulties you perceive (if any) with using untrained, spontaneous volunteers?</p>
<p>Minor question d. Do you see room for greater coordination and cooperation between emergency services and spontaneous volunteer organisations? What could this realistically look like?</p>
<p>Minor question e. Do you think the activities of spontaneous organisations should remain separate from the emergency service response?</p>
<p>Minor question f. Do you think emergency services should support spontaneous volunteer organisations? If so how?</p>
<p>Minor question g. How can spontaneous volunteer organisations ensure they gain trust and credibility when they arise spontaneously during disaster events?</p>
<p>Sub - research question 3: What pre-planned initiatives and future actions could potentially be undertaken by the emergency service agencies to better prepare for the emergence of spontaneous organisations? What are the implications of translating this into practice?</p>

Minor question a. Is there greater potential for spontaneous volunteer organisations to be used within all phases of disasters?
Minor question b. Could spontaneous volunteer organisations be involved in preparedness or other activities in advance of disaster events?
Minor question c. Do you provide 'on-the-spot' training of spontaneous volunteers? Why/why not?
Minor question d. Are there activities within your organisations that spontaneous volunteers could contribute to with 'on-the-spot' training?
Minor question e. Do you believe that the spontaneous volunteer organisations are sufficiently integrated into emergency plans?
Minor question f. Can these plans be enacted by emergency service agencies during disaster events?
Minor question g. What is your agency currently doing or planning to do to make better use this spontaneous volunteer resource?
Minor question h. Does your agency see opportunities to translate spontaneous volunteering into longer-term volunteering?
Minor question i. What would you like to see from spontaneous volunteer organisations as well as other agencies to help you cope with the influx of spon volunteers as well as their management?
QUESTIONS FOR SPONTANEOUS VOLUNTEER GROUPS
Sub - research question 1: Can spontaneous volunteer organisations contribute to community disaster resilience? How?
Minor question a. Do you think that spontaneous volunteer organisations can contribute to community disaster resilience? How do they do this? Can you give brief examples?
Minor question b. Which phases of the emergency management cycle does your organisation work in (prevention, preparedness, response/relief or recovery)?
Minor question c. What is/was the focus of your organisation's activities and how do they contribute to building community resilience?
Minor question d. What needs prompted your organisation to arise spontaneously? How have those needs evolved?
Minor question e. Has your organisation transitioned from spontaneous from spontaneous to organised?
Minor question f. Would you continue to take on spontaneous volunteers? Why/why not?
Sub - research question 2: How can emergency service agencies best support and facilitate spontaneous volunteer organisations?
Minor question a. What were the main barriers you faced in setting up your organisation?
Minor question b. What has helped your organisation achieve its aims?
Minor question c. Do you see room for greater coordination and cooperation between emergency services and spontaneous volunteer organisations? If so what could this realistically look like?
Minor question d. What additional (if any) support would you like to see from emergency services agencies?

Minor question e. How can spontaneous volunteer organisations ensure they gain trust and credibility when they arise spontaneously during disaster events?
Sub - research question 3: What pre-planned initiatives and future actions could potentially be undertaken by the emergency service agencies to better prepare for the emergence of spontaneous organisations? What are the implications of translating this into practice?
Minor question a. How could your organisation expand into other areas of the emergency management cycle (prevention, preparedness, response/relief or recovery) for future disaster events?
Minor question c. What are the practical barriers of translating these actions into practice?
Minor question d. What post-disaster activities could be contributed to by your organisation in advance of emergency events to contribute to community resilience?
Minor question e. In your experience, do spontaneous volunteers tend to continue to volunteer in an ongoing manner or is their commitment short-term?
Minor question f. Do they continue to contribute to community resilience? Why is this?

Appendix Three: Key acronyms and abbreviations

ESAs: Emergency Service Agencies: ESAs
 SVGs: Spontaneous Volunteer Groups: SVGs
 CSOs: Community-based Support Organisations: CSOs
 EMA: Emergency Management Australia
 EMV: Emergency Management Victoria
 CFA: Country Fire Authority
 SES: State Emergency Service
 FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency

Appendix Four: Interview Participants

Emergency Service Agencies (ESAs):

- > CFA: Bruce Byatt
- > SES: Kaylene Sudholz
- > EMV: Paul Davis

Community-based Support Organisations:

- > Volunteering Queensland: Julie Molloy
- > Murrindindi Shire Council: Anne Leadbeater

Spontaneous Volunteer Groups

- > BlazeAid/BlazeAlert: Kevin Butler
- > Tassie Fires We Can Help Group: Melanie Irons
- > Student Volunteer Army: Sam Johnston

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