BRIEFING PAPER: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING NON-TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY VOLUNTEERS

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Cover: BlazeAid volunteers after the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. Photo by BlazeAid.

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ABSTRACT

BRIEFING PAPER: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING NON-TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY VOLUNTEERS

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This briefing paper presents a proposed framework for assessing the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of four broad, alternative strategies available to emergency management organisations (EMOs) for engaging with non-traditional emergency volunteers and voluntary organisations: Ignore, Resist, Accept, and Embrace. The framework explicitly requires consideration of multifaceted consequences for key stakeholders groups beyond established EMOs (e.g. communities impacted, the volunteers themselves), and across the emergency management cycle (before, during and after an event).

The briefing paper begins with a research-based context and rationale for developing the engagement framework. It then presents the proposed engagement framework itself and briefly outlines a process that will be used between July and December 2016 to test and refine the framework for use by EMOs as an applied decision support tool. The refinement process is centred on a series of interactive workshops with key stakeholder groups to test the framework in an applied setting.

The engagement framework is being developed by RMIT researchers as a component of the Bushfire and Natural Hazard's *Out of uniform: building community resilience through non-traditional emergency volunteering* project (http://www.bnhcrc.com.au/research/resilient-people-infrastructure-and-institutions/248).

GLOSSARY

(Traditional) emergency management volunteering	Formal, accredited volunteers who are affiliated with emergency management organisations (EMOs), and are mostly involved in response and immediate recovery roles.
Classic/ traditional volunteering	Involves "a lifelong and demanding commitment" to an organisation, and is underpinned by "traditional" collective and altruistic values and devotion to community service [1, p.168].
Digital/ virtual volunteering	"Completed, in whole or in part, using the Internet and a home, school, telecenter, or work computer or other Internet-connected device, such as a smartphone (a cell phone with Internet functions) or personal digital assistant (PDA)" [2, p.1].
Emergency management organisations (EMOs)	Governmental and non-governmental organisations that include emergency management functions in their core organisational goals, and have recognised roles in the relevant state and territory, district or municipal emergency management and recovery plans.
Emergent volunteerism	New forms of volunteering that occur in response to unmet needs, whether perceived or real" [3]
Episodic volunteers	"individuals who engage in one-time or short-term volunteer opportunities" [4, p.30]
Extending volunteerism	Occurs when a voluntary organisation without an emergency management role extends its volunteer activities into that area in response to an event or an increase in risk awareness [3].
Formal volunteering	"Takes place within organisations (including institutions and agencies) in a structured way" [5]
Informal volunteering	"Acts that take place outside the context of a formal organisation" [5].
Non-traditional emergency volunteering	Any type of volunteering that is: 1) Focused on emergency prevention, preparedness, response, or recovery and 2) Involves volunteers who are not traditional emergency management volunteers affiliated with established emergency management organisations (EMOs).
Spontaneous volunteering	'Those who seek to contribute on impulse—people who offer assistance following a disaster and who are not previously affiliated with recognised volunteer agencies and may or may not have relevant training, skills or experience' [6, p.10, 7].
Volunteering	"Any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another person, group or organisation" [8, p.215]. "Time willingly given for the common good and without financial gain" [5, p.2]

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PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

This briefing paper presents a proposed framework for assessing the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of alternative strategies for emergency management organisations to engage with non-traditional emergency volunteers ('engagement framework').

It then outlines a process to test and refine the proposed engagement framework for use as an applied decision support tool ('refinement process'). The refinement process is centred on a series of interactive workshops with key end user groups ('SWOT workshops').

The engagement framework is being developed by RMIT researchers with stakeholder input for use by established emergency management organisations (EMOs). These are the governmental and non-governmental organisations that include emergency management functions in their core organisational goals and have recognised roles in the relevant state and territory, district or municipal emergency management and recovery plans.

This process is a component of the Bushfire and Natural Hazard's *Out of uniform: building community resilience through non-traditional emergency volunteering* project (http://www.bnhcrc.com.au/research/resilient-people-infrastructure-and-institutions/248).

WHAT IS NON-TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY VOLUNTEERING?

For the purposes of this process, non-traditional emergency volunteering is defined as any type of volunteering that is: 1) Focused on emergency prevention, preparedness, response, or recovery and 2) Involves volunteers who are not traditional emergency management volunteers affiliated with established EMOs. Non-traditional emergency volunteering is extremely diverse. It can be formal, informal, emergent and/or extending (see Glossary). It can involve citizen action that is spontaneous and unplanned, as well as actions that are planned and organised but undertaken without direct affiliation to established EMOs.

Notably, what constitutes 'non-traditional' emergency volunteering is not fixed. It may change over time as approaches to volunteer management shift, such that volunteer activity that is considered to be outside the 'norm' for established EMOs, and voluntary organisations that are not currently part of the formal emergency management arrangements, may become more accepted and hence mainstreamed in the future.

A starting premise of the *Out of uniform* project is that non-traditional emergency volunteering is a legitimate and important component of a society's disaster management capacity and activity, and that it is:

1. Inevitable

2. Beneficial to the emergency management efforts when it is planned for and supported appropriately, and

3. A critical element of longer-term community resilience.

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WHY IS AN ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK NEEDED?

Given the diversity of non-traditional emergency volunteering, and the various barriers that exist for EMOs to engage with it (see following section), making decisions about appropriate engagement strategies can be complex and difficult.

Broadly speaking, established EMOs may adopt engagement strategies that reflect one of four general approaches towards non-traditional emergency volunteers in their overall operations, or in particular parts of their operations. These are: **Ignore, Resist, Accept,** or **Embrace.** Each of these approaches will bring different sets of potential benefits, limitations and risks for the EMO and other key stakeholder groups. It is therefore necessary for EMOs to carefully consider the possible implications of the different alternatives for engaging with a particular case or instance of non-traditional emergency volunteering within the specific context of the organisation, its structure, responsibilities and activities.

Significantly, not all of the potential consequences of the different approaches will be immediately evident to a particular organisation at a particular point in time. This is especially so for consequences that may arise for other key stakeholder groups, and for flow-on consequences that are longer-term and reach beyond an organisation's own specific areas and phases of function and responsibility. Other key stakeholder groups that need to be considered include the communities impacted, the volunteers themselves, and the volunteer involving organisation (VIO) or leaders that engage the volunteers. Examples of important flow-on consequences that may be overlooked are longer-term community resilience outcomes, positive and negative consequences of non-engagement, and subsequent consequences in other phases of the emergency management cycle (e.g. before, during or after an emergency event).

Furthermore, without decision support, established EMOs may perceive greater risks with non-traditional emergency volunteers and voluntary organisations and overlook or downgrade potential benefits due to a lack of awareness, unfamiliarity, or risk aversion. This can add to the existing organisational barriers to engagement identified in research and summarised in the following section. This is significant given that research reveals many benefits for the emergency management effort and for community resilience from more active engagement between EMOs and non-traditional emergency volunteering efforts.

The proposed engagement framework presented in this paper has therefore been designed to explicitly identify less evident and more multifaceted flow-on consequences alongside those that are more immediately evident to EMOs in order to provide a more complete and better-informed basis for making strategic decisions about engaging with non-traditional emergency volunteering.

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BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

CONTEXT

Community participation is a key principle of emergency and disaster management [9-12]. Yet in most developed countries, emergency and disaster management relies largely on a workforce of professionals and, to varying degrees, volunteers affiliated with official agencies. Individuals and groups who work outside of this system have tended to be viewed as a nuisance or liability, and their efforts are often undervalued [13-16]. Given increasing disaster risk worldwide due to population growth, urban development and climate change [17], it is likely that volunteers who are not formally affiliated with official agencies will provide much of the additional surge capacity required to respond to more frequent emergencies and disasters in the future.

In 2015 Volunteering Australia introduced a new definition of volunteering: 'Volunteering is time willingly given for the common good and without financial gain'[5]. An important feature of this definition is that it includes formal volunteering that takes place within organisations and in a structured way, and volunteering that takes place outside the context of a formal organisation. It reflects the shifting landscape of volunteering in Australia due to changes in the nature of work and lifestyles, new information and communications technologies (ICTs), growing private sector involvement, and increasing government expectations of volunteers [18]. As a result of this shifting landscape, emergency managers can expect to engage with a much wider and more diverse range of volunteering that brings new opportunities but also risks.

NON-TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY VOLUNTEERING

The roles played by citizens in emergency and disaster management are widely documented in disaster research. Research challenges popular perceptions that disasters unleash chaos and disorganisation, with citizens becoming passive victims, panic-stricken, or engaging in antisocial behaviours such as looting [19, 20]. Instead, people have been found to become more cohesive than in 'normal' times and typically work together to overcome collective challenges [3].

Convergence of people and materials (e.g. donated goods) can be expected to occur in most emergencies and disasters and, while almost always well-intentioned, can also create problems and challenges for emergency managers if not planned for appropriately. For example, unsolicited donations may be inappropriate or unnecessary, requiring expenditure of valuable resources for their management or disposal and require the expenditure of resources for their management or disposal [21]. Similarly, convergence of spontaneous volunteers can pose challenges related to crowd-control, resourcing and logistics, and occupational health and safety [3, 22]. Nevertheless, as Auf der Heide [23] stresses, 'local authorities need to recognise that unsolicited volunteers will show up, and procedures must be developed for processing these volunteers and integrating them into the response' (p. 465).

The Disaster Research Centre's (DRC) typology of organised response to disaster [24, 25] provides a useful framework for thinking about non-traditional emergency volunteering (see Table 1). It identifies four types of organisation based on a classification of tasks (regular and non-regular) and structure (old or new).

		TASKS	
		Regular	**Non-regular**
STRUCTURE	**Old**	TYPE I: ESTABLISHED	TYPE III: EXTENDING
	New	TYPE II: EXPANDING	TYPE IV: EMERGENT

TABLE 1: THE DRC TYPOLOGY OF ORGANISED RESPONSE TO DISASTERS [24]

- *Type I* – **Established organisations** undertake routine tasks performed through existing structures, such as fire suppression performed by a state fire agency.

- Type II – **Expanding organisations** undertake regular tasks through new structures. These are typically volunteer associations or groups whose core activities are non-emergency related but have latent emergency functions. The Salvation Army would be considered an expanding organisation because its core mission is human welfare but it has historically become involved in disaster relief when needed.

- *Type III* – **Extending organisations** have established structures but take on new and unexpected functions during the emergency period. For example, a sporting club may mobilise its members to deliver food and clothing to people who lose their home in a bushfire. Extending organisations often work in conjunction with established and expanding organisations; however, they can present challenges because they do not come under the effective control of the latter.

- *Type IV* – **Emergent organisations** are groups with new structures (formal or informal) and new tasks. They emerge when needs are not being met, or it is perceived that needs are not being met, by other organisations. These groups often play critical 'first responder' roles (e.g. search and rescue; first aid) but may be active for longer periods before, during and after emergencies and disasters. Like extending organisations, they can pose significant challenges for emergency managers.

This briefing paper is primarily concerned with 'extending' and 'emergent' volunteering, whether as individuals or part of a group or organisation, and occurring before, during or after emergency events. There are many labels given to such volunteers: spontaneous, unaffiliated, informal, episodic, digital, casual, community-based and so on. A key message here is that such volunteering is not always spontaneous. It is often anticipated, planned, and predictable – particularly when it extends or emerges out of existing volunteer or community groups [3].

A key strength of many forms of non-traditional emergency volunteering is volunteers' proximity to the emergency or disaster, meaning they are often first on the scene and remain long after official services are withdrawn. Their proximity often allows them to be on-site regularly or for extended periods of time, making real-time observations of what is happening on the ground. They often have intimate understandings of local impacts and are able to mobilise local networks and resources to help affected people [3]. However, the increasing accessibility of sophisticated yet simple information and communications technologies means that volunteers need not be near an emergency or disaster to participate, or participate at regular times or for set periods. Digital volunteerism is likely to become increasingly prevalent in emergency management, largely due to changes in the nature of work, lifestyles and volunteer expectations [18].

'Command-and-control' as a barrier to engagement

The way in which citizens are able to participate in emergency and disaster management depends partly on formal institutional structures and arrangements. Most developed countries employ bureaucratic, command-and-control approaches that originate in the paramilitary roots of emergency and disaster management [25, 26]. Command-and-control approaches are underpinned by a range of assumptions: bureaucratic response occurs in a vacuum; information outside of official channels is lacking or inaccurate; standard operating procedures will always function in disasters; departures from bureaucratic guidelines are detrimental; citizens are inept, passive or non-participants in disaster operations; and ad hoc emergence is counterproductive [27]. However, as noted above, disaster research challenges many of these assumptions. It demonstrates that citizens tend to become more cohesive and engage in pro-social behaviour in times of crisis.

These findings are the starting point for an alternative approach to emergency and disaster management that involves 'loosening rather than tightening up the command structure' [28, p.381]. Dynes [29] proposes a 'problem-solving' approach whereby emergencies and disasters are viewed as sets of problems that must be addressed with existing resources within the community. This approach rests on a more realistic set of assumptions and principles, derived from empirical research: emergencies do not reduce the capacities of individuals and social units to cope, but rather present new challenges; existing social structure is the most effective way to address these challenges; social units are resources for problem solving, rather than problems in themselves; and emergencies are characterised by decentralised and pluralistic decision-making, so autonomy of decision-making should be valued over centralisation of authority [29].

Harrald [30] conceptualises this challenge in terms of balancing 'discipline' (structure, doctrine, process) and agility (creativity, improvisation, adaptability). A degree of discipline is needed for large organisations to be mobilised and managed; yet agility is needed to ensure broad coordination and communication. Discipline is also needed to ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of services under extreme conditions, while agility is necessary to enable creativity, improvisation and adaptability in the face of uncertainty. Structure and process are needed to ensure the technical and organisational

interoperability of emergency and disaster management organisations. However, EMOs must also be flexible enough to interact with and capitalise on the many volunteers and emergent organisations that want to help without undermining their motivations, contributions and ways of working.

Concerns about health, safety and legal liability

Concerns about health, safety and legal liability are a potential barrier to greater participation of non-traditional emergency volunteers. However, there have been few studies related to issues of safety and liability for non-agency volunteers [31]. Volunteers may risk physical or psychological harm to themselves and others if they engage in activities without appropriate knowledge, skills, equipment and training [see 3 for examples].

Orloff [32] identifies two main liability risks for emergency management agencies arising from the participation of 'spontaneous' volunteers. The first is that volunteers or their families will sue agencies for death, injury or damages incurred as a result of volunteer activities, the second is that recipients of help will sue agencies for the unintended or intended consequences of volunteers' actions. In the USA, confusion about liability stems from complicated laws, inconsistent protections from state to state, and the often multiple affiliations of volunteers that blur lines of responsibility for protection [32].

Eburn [33] notes that a number of Australian States have introduced legislation to limit the liability of 'Good Samaritans' and voluntary members of community organisations. These Acts are primarily intended to protect those who respond to medical emergencies where life is threatened, for example by providing first aid or medical care. Importantly, they do not apply to Good Samaritans who act to protect property. Those who provide emergency assistance must act in good faith (i.e. their intention must be to assist the person concerned) and without the expectation of payment or other reward. While most of the Acts intent to protect volunteers from personal liability, it is important to note that the organisation for which they are volunteering may still be liabile [33]. Nevertheless, Saaroni's [34, 35] study of spontaneous volunteer management in Victoria found very little evidence of governments being sued for the actions of spontaneous volunteers and noted that litigation against volunteers is uncommon.

While further research into legal liability and volunteer safety is needed, the risks associated with non-traditional emergency volunteering can be minimised. Hospitals routinely manage risks associated with the use of volunteer health professionals during emergencies through prior planning and training to meet surge capacity, and through strict credentialing procedures [36]. Safety can be increased and liability risks reduced through registering, training, credentialing, assigning appropriate tasks, and supervising volunteers [31, 37]. However, such measures are unlikely to be effective where volunteerism is more informal and emergent. Emergency managers must therefore be attuned to what is happening on the ground and be prepared to engage with a diverse range of volunteers.

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SWOT ANALYSIS

The proposed engagement framework and refinement process presented here are based on SWOT analysis methods. SWOT analysis (also called 'environmental' or 'situational analysis', see [38]) is arguably "one of the most respected and prevalent tools of strategic planning" [39, p.216]. In its most basic form it involves the use of a simple two-by-two matrix to guide an assessment of internal and external helpful and harmful factors influencing on the position of an organisation, project or strategic option. Strengths and weaknesses are internal to the entity under assessment, and opportunities and threats are external to it (see Figure 1). Examples of internal factors that may represent either strengths or weaknesses include human and financial resources, skills, social capital, experience and infrastructure. Examples of external factors that can present opportunities or threats/risks include social trends, funding availability, demographics and legislation, amongst other things.

FIGURE 1: BASIC SWOT FRAMEWORK

SWOT analysis can be applied in more regulated and quantitative, or more 'organic' and qualitative ways for different contexts [39]. Although originally developed for use by business and industry to assess the position of an organisation in a competitive market environment, it is also applicable to strategic planning by governmental and community sector organisations, albeit usually in an adapted and more qualitative form, and with broad stakeholder input [39, 40].

Key limitations recognised with SWOT analysis include:

* While it assists with the identification and understanding of issues

affecting a decision, it does not offer solutions or assist with specific strategy development [40]

- It does not, on its own, weight or prioritise the relative importance of individual factors to assist with decision-making [39].

In the context of public sector and community sector organisations, SWOT analysis has also been critiqued as an overly managerialistic approach that rests on false assumptions of highly rational organisations that are clearly demarcated [41]. It is also considered by some to be overly vague and "dangerously simplistic" [39, p.234]. While these criticisms are valid, they indicate a need to use SWOT analysis in a thoughtful and reflective way, adapted to suit specific contextual needs, rather than an intrinsically flawed approach overall.

The use of SWOT analysis in the development and refinement of the engagement framework presented here adopts a more 'organic' method that can accommodate varied interests and points of view in a qualitative, discursive way. It is used as a tool to identify a wider range of consequences and issues arising from alternative strategic models in a participatory, workshop environment, rather than as a regulated, quantitative system for prioiritising one decision over another.

KEY POINTS

- Non-traditional emergency volunteering is a legitimate and important component of a society's disaster management capacity and activity. It is 1) inevitable, 2) beneficial for formal emergency management efforts when appropriately planned for and supported, and 3) a critical element of longer-term community resilience.

- There are many labels given to such volunteers: spontaneous, unaffiliated, informal, episodic, digital, casual, community-based and so on. However, such volunteering is not always spontaneous. It is often anticipated, planned and predictable – particularly when it extends or emerges out of existing volunteer and community groups.

- Non-traditional emergency volunteers are often first on the scene and remain long after official services cease. Their proximity enables them to be on-site regularly or for extended periods of time. They often have intimate understandings of local impacts and are able to mobilise local networks and resources to help affected people.

- Command-and-control approaches to emergency and disaster management impede the participation of non-traditional emergency volunteers. Command structures may be loosened to allow greater creativity, improvisation and adaptability.

- Concerns about health, safety and legal liability are a potential barrier non-traditional emergency volunteering. There is a range of measures through which health and safety risks can be minimised. There is little evidence of litigation against volunteers, volunteer organisations or government agencies.

- While it has recognised limitations, SWOT analysis is a tried and tested method for strategic planning that can assist the assessment of alternative strategic planning options. Care is needed, however, in ensuring it is applied appropriately and thoughtfully with wide stakeholder input and with recognition that, on its own, it cannot guide strategy development nor prioritise competing factors.

KEY POINTS

PROPOSED ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

The proposed engagement framework presented here includes four broad alternative strategic approaches for EMO engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers (see Figure 2). The four approaches – **Ignore, Resist, Accept,** and **Embrace** – involve a progressively increasing degree of engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers, and of organisational change and power-sharing required by the EMO involved (see Figure 2).

Each of the four approaches will involve differing sets of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats for established EMOs (including their staff and traditional volunteers) and for the other key stakeholder groups, being:

1) The communities impacted by an emergency or disaster,

2) The (non-traditional) volunteers,

3) The volunteer-involving organisation (VIO) or volunteer leaders that engage the volunteers, and

4) Other case specific stakeholder groups (e.g. referral or brokering organisations, other government departments).

Increasing degree of engagement, organisational change and power-sharing

| Ignore	Resist	Accept	Embrace
No intended engagement, no plans in place.	Dissuade, stop or exclude volunteers.	Reduce risks, or refer volunteers but do not directly manage or encourage.	Directly manage or support volunteers, or facilitate other EMOs to do so.

FIGURE 2: FOUR BROAD STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING NON-TRADITIONAL EMERGENCY VOLUNTEERS AND VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

IGNORE

The first approach in the framework is to ignore non-traditional emergency volunteers and voluntary organisations and fail to put any plans in place to engage with them.

Such an approach denies the legitimacy of non-traditional emergency volunteers as actors in emergency and disaster management. Responsibility and power is seen to lie with official agencies, which are considered capable of responding independently or with the assistance of other established EMOs. EMOs adopting this approach are likely to be more hierarchical and employ command-and-control management structures. Engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers is avoided, and policies, plans and procedures are not developed. The 'Ignore' approach may be adopted to maintain the authority, hierarchy and functioning of established EMOs.

RESIST

The second approach is to resist engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers by attempting to dissuade, stop or exclude volunteers. Examples include physically restricting access to impacted communities, and media campaigns to dissuade volunteering beyond traditional emergency management volunteers.

Under this approach, non-traditional emergency volunteers are likely to be viewed as illegitimate actors in emergency management. EMOs adopting this approach are also likely to be hierarchical and employ command-and-control management structures. Non-traditional emergency volunteering may be resisted in order to maintain the authority, hierarchy and functioning of established agencies, or because agencies are unable to make necessary changes. Concerns about health, safety and legal liability may also lead agencies to resist engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers.

ACCEPT

The third approach is to accept non-traditional emergency volunteers and voluntary organisations as inevitable in emergency and disaster management and plan for their participation without directly engaging them or facilitating or encouraging their increased participation. Examples include putting plans in place to manage risks associated with a convergence of spontaneous volunteers on a disaster site, or providing information about emergency management arrangements and policy to organisations and groups working from outside the formal arrangements but not altering those arrangements to open greater space for their participation.

Under this approach, responsibility for managing risk before, during and after emergencies is shared between government, non-government organisations, the private sector and communities, but largely in accordance with existing arrangements and procedures. Non-traditional emergency volunteering is acknowledged as being inevitable, but is largely viewed as a risk or nuisance to be reduced or managed rather than as legitimate and valuable participants in emergency management. EMOs adopting this type of approach are likely to be less hierarchical than those that ignore and resist non-traditional emergency volunteering and employ more problem-solving approaches (Dynes, 1994). Policies, plans and procedures are developed specifically to guide engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers with a primary focus on risk management.

EMBRACE

The fourth approach is to embrace non-traditional emergency volunteers and voluntary organisations as legitimate participants in emergency and disaster management and to either engage them directly or actively encourage and facilitate their involvement. Examples include putting systems in place to actively use spontaneous volunteers (e.g. Volunteering Queensland's EV –CREW model see [37]), or developing policies to facilitate and enable non-traditional forms of

emergency volunteering such as community-based planning or community-led recovery committees.

Under this approach, citizens are viewed as capable and resourceful actors whose participation is not only inevitable but also indispensable. EMOs that embrace non-traditional emergency volunteers in this way are likely to exhibit low levels of hierarchy and employ participatory, problem-solving approaches (Dynes 1994). Engagement with non-traditional emergency volunteers is anticipated and may be planned for; however, EMOs that adopt this approach may be more flexible, adaptive and innovative in the way they engage and enable non-traditional emergency volunteering.

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK

Applying the engagement framework to assess alternative engagement strategies for specific cases of non-traditional volunteering involves a simple two-step SWOT analysis.

Step 1

The first step is a basic SWOT analysis of the particular non-traditional volunteering case or instance being considered that explicitly considers Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats across two key variables:

1. **The emergency management cycle** (before, during and after an emergency event)

2. **Key stakeholder groups** (Communities impacted, volunteers, VIO or volunteer leaders, established EMOs, Other case specific stakeholder groups)

From this process, the key potential consequences (positive and negative) across the variables can be identified to reduce the number of factors to be included in the second step.

Step 2

The second step is a comparative SWOT analysis of the four engagement strategies that similarly considers these two sets of variables (see Figure 3).

It is highly desirable that the engagement framework is used in a discursive, facilitated workshop setting with broad representation from different stakeholder groups.

The output of the process is a map of key consequences, positive and negative, including flow-on consequences for other stakeholders and across the emergency management cycle.

			Ignore	Resist	Accept	Embrace
			No intended engagement, no plans in place.	*Dissuade, stop or exclude volunteers.*	*Reduce risks, or refer volunteers but do not directly manage or support.*	*Directly engage or support volunteers, or facilitate other EMOs to do so.*
Internal		**Strengths**				
		Weaknesses				
External		**Opportunities**				
		Threats				

Variables to consider:
- Phase: Disaster management cycle: before, during, after event, across cycle
- Stakeholder groups: Communities impacted - C, volunteers - V, VIO/leaders - L, established EMOs - E, Other stakeholder groups - O

FIGURE 3: COMPARATIVE ENGAGEMENT SWOT ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

REFINEMENT PROCESS

Figure 4, over page, summarises the framework refinement process that will be undertaken in July-December 2016, and its key outputs.

The pivotal step in the process is '**Test – Phase 2**', which will involve a series of **SWOT workshops** that will be undertaken with a multi-stakeholder group to apply the framework to specific case studies. Four to five workshops are anticipated, to be held in different jurisdictions in October 2016. A number of different case studies of key types of non-traditional volunteering across the emergency management cycle will be used as the basis for the workshops, including emergent and extending forms of non-traditional volunteerism. The outputs of the workshops, as well as participant evaluation and feedback on the process, will be used to refine the engagement framework.

A final step – '**Apply**' – is beyond the scope of the current research project and may be included as a component of planned future work in this area.

NEXT STEPS

The next steps in refining the framework is **Phase 1** of testing, which includes applying the framework to case studies of non-traditional emergency volunteering already undertaken by the *Out of uniform* research team, and circulating this briefing paper and the case study examples to a selected panel of stakeholders for review and feedback.

Process

Outputs

Propose

Proposed engagement framework developed by research team

This **Briefing Paper**

Test - Phase 1

| (1) Framework applied to case studies by research team | (2) Feedback on proposed framework from key stakeholders |

Case study **Examples** and **Feedback Report**

Revise

Results of Phase 1 testing incoporated into revised engagement framework

Revised **Briefing Paper**

Test - Phase 2

SWOT workshops with stakeholder groups

Workshop Report

Refine

SWOT workshop results incorporated into final engagement framework

Final **Engagement Framework**

Apply *[out of current project scope]*

Testing and refinement of 'real world' application of framework by EMOs

Guidance for applying framework

FIGURE 4: FRAMEWORK REFINEMENT PROCESS

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